True, in various periods, the mix of motives changes. And to some extent, this mix can be affected. However, the most effective way to proceed is not to try to increase altruism but to modify what people do to serve themselves. For example, if we need more nurses, we ought to pay them more and show more respect for their work. There is room for changes in values and moral commitments, but those are difficult to engineer. Here a study of what Al Gore, Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton, and Bono have been doing recently—how they proceeded, what worked and what did not, and how lasting the effects of their work have been—would be of much interest. This is not the route Waldman chose to follow.

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Vincenzo Galasso is a professor of economics at Bocconi University, Italy. His book aims to “provide a quantitative assessment of the political sustainability of social security” (p. 57) in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. (By “social security” Galasso means public pension provisions, a definition I shall return to later.) His stated contribution is to add a political variable to the economic and demographic variables commonly used by economists in order to focus more directly on “politically sustainable reform packages” (p. 3, his emphasis). This variable is based on the idea of structured induced equilibrium developed by Kenneth Shepsle and others. Galasso’s simulation findings and argument, which seem intuitively plausible, and which are reflected in current policy debates, are that raising the retirement age for receiving full pension benefits both makes a significant difference in the long-term economic viability of these pay-as-you-go schemes and is politically possible to introduce.

As we can see from this overview, the book has a number of strengths. It is clearly written and concise, increasing its appeal to graduate and advanced undergraduate students, one of Galasso’s proposed audiences. The book also presents a careful descriptive review of policy developments in each country, both in separate chapters and in very useful comparative tables. And because he covers more countries than is usual in comparative studies of this type, and because his information is so up to date, Galasso adds to our understanding of countries neglected in the literature in English. For me, Galasso provided a particularly succinct and informative guide to the Italian experience in general and to the Dini reforms in particular. The final merit of this book, as I noted earlier, is policy related; Galasso’s discussion of raising the retirement age is carefully grounded methodologically and could be useful in policy debate.
I must also note a number of limitations, which I hope stay within the spirit of the author’s intentions. The most important is that the term “social security” is restricted, as it is in the United States, to pensions only. That is too bad; using the term in the French sense would also encompass health provisions, which are much more salient in assessing the economic and political challenges facing aging societies. (To be sure, at first blush costs and political dynamics can look different in countries like Britain, where the National Health Service has a separate budget. Fiscal constraints and future cost uncertainties, however, are the same.) The political dynamics are much more complex and contentious, and the costs are much harder to predict and control. Second, for the American case, while Galasso notes the significance of corporate (employer) pensions, he does not incorporate them into his analysis. But these pensions are the most fiscally fragile and socially fraught aspects of the American “system”: they must be included in any analysis of political futures.

Third, in my view, his political variable also is too narrowly drawn. The methodology seems to drive the choice of variables, and in this instance, it is extraordinarily unlikely that voter decisions are in fact driven by social security concerns as Galasso defines them. For an understanding of the political dynamics, we need to introduce parties and interest groups. This is not a question of whether the analysis is quantitative or not. Alexander Hicks, in Social Democracy and Welfare Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), for example, offers an outstanding quantitatively based study of the development of social security broadly defined. To be sure, he does use multiple quantitative and qualitative methods, but that is all to the good.

Finally, each of the six countries is considered as a discrete economic and political unit. In policy studies, this rather common position has masked the major role of diffusion or policy learning in Europe and North America. (There is a useful literature on this subject, which highlights the historic centrality of the German experience.) Today, policy analysts are looking farther afield, with the experiment in Chile receiving much attention. And for four of these countries, there is a new consideration—the development of the European Union. The euro and the European central bank (the British pound and central bank remain independent) already constrict the ability of the member states to extract themselves from budget dilemmas by printing money. The recent spat between the French president and the European Commission over the French social security budget points to the utility of a multi-level analysis.

In sum, Galasso has written a useful book, the merits of which are restricted by an overly narrow methodology and definition of the problem of social security in aging societies. I would certainly consider it for a graduate course in comparative social policy, supplemented by a work such as Hicks’s and a study of comparative health care provision. Mary Ruggie’s Realignments in the Welfare State: Health Policy in the United States, Britain and Canada (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) and Paul Dutton’s just-published Different Diagnosis: Health Care Problems in the United States and France
Keith Whittington seeks to explain the rise of judicial supremacy—the view that the Supreme Court is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution, giving the last word on the Constitution’s meaning for everyone—as an institutional and political development in U.S. history, rather than as a matter of law. “Given the evident power of elected government officials to intimidate, co-opt, ignore, or dismantle the judiciary, we need to understand why they have generally chosen not to use that power and instead to defer to judicial authority” (p. 11).

Focusing on how the presidency, in particular, has affected the development of judicial supremacy, Whittington analyzes the problem using Stephen Skowronek’s model of presidential regimes to distinguish three different relational dynamics between presidents and the Court. In chapter 2, Whittington examines how reconstructive presidents—those who challenge the fundamental commitments of the current political regime—have also tended to challenge judicial supremacy by advocating departmentalism, judicial supremacy’s main competitor, which argues that other government institutions may interpret the Constitution for themselves.

In chapters 3 and 4, Whittington examines, respectively, how affiliate and preemptive presidents—those who align themselves with the current political regime or else who oppose it—both have incentives to reinforce and expand judicial power. While it is obvious that a president who seeks to maintain the current regime would probably, for various reasons, strengthen a judiciary that concurs with the regime, Whittington shows that this incentive also exists for presidents who oppose the current regime. Preemptive presidents occupy a politically precarious position in having to embrace some aspects of the current regime while opposing others, and usually lack the power to challenge the Court. Counterintuitively, however, such presidents may nevertheless be able to enlist the Court as an ally in conflicts with their political rivals, such as Congress. Whittington also considers how the president’s role as the head of his political party influences his relational dynamic with the Court.

While Whittington is critical of approaches that attempt to resolve the question of judicial supremacy as a matter of law, he does not adopt a simplistic account of judicial power that expands only when the Court’s decisions are aligned with the agenda of the dominant political regime. His analysis is much...